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Supreme Court No. 16321

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs sought and obtained a judgment against
Defendants estopping them from withholding approval of
Plaintiffs' proposed residential subdivision plan.
DISPOSITION IN LO\',-ER COURT
The lower court ordered that the subdivision be approved
and that subsequent development within it be allowed free
from any

c;ub,~rcqtll'lll

zonjng changes limiting or restricting

resiSponsored
dPnt by
i athel S.J.w-;<'s.
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NATURE OF RELILF SOUGHT 0:.1 APPEAL
Defendants seek to reverse the lower court's order
estopping Defendants from disapproving Plaintiffs'
proposed residential subdivision.
STATEME~T

OF FACTS

In or about June 1977, Plaintiffs approached the
City of Logan in the course of preyaring a preliminary
plan for a residential subdivision to be located in an
M-l(hlanufacturing) zone.

R.l53.

Single family dwellings

were permitted uses in that zone at the time of the
application, but the zoning ordinance was amended on
January 31, 1978 to allow such uses only occasionally and
incidental to manufacturing uses by special use permit.
Whole residential subdivisions were
(Sec. 17-4-2(e), Logan City

prohibi~d.

R.lOl.

Ordina~ces.)

Shortly after initial contact with the City, in
conversations with the Plaintiffs' engineer, the City
Planner questioned the advisability of developing a
residential subdivision plat in the area proposed.

R.l53.

Plaintiffs, nevertheless, continued with tl1eir plans,
prepared a preliminary subdivision plat,

(R.l55) expending

$890 for it and another $1,335 for a boundary survey.

R.l23.

The Planning Commission's practice is to merely
introduce the preliminary plat in one m~eting (first reading)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-2Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and in the
action.

S<·cotHl

R.JSG"

July 13, 1977.
August 10, 1077.

meeting discuss its merits and take
Plaintiffs' project li·as introduced on

R.85-86.

The s~cond reading was held on

Some concerns were expressed by the

Planning Commission (R.90) and the ruatter was tabled and

R.86.

referred to the Municipal Council for their input.

On

August 18, 1977, the Municipal Council reviewed the matter
and expressed some concerns about protecting the potential
residential area from manufacturing uses within the
development and that more roadways in and out of the
subdivision be provided.

R.92, 157.

The preliminary plan second reading continued tefore
the Planning Commission on September 14, 1977 at which time
concern about the danger of the adjacent railroad activity
was cxpressed,and the matter was tabled for sixty days.

R.94.

Although the matter was not before them for approval,

on October 12, 1977, the Planning

Coi.~ission

and Planner

discussed the intent of the City's zoning ordinance as it
relates to residential uses in H-1 zones.

R.95.

The intent

of the ordinance was to allow citizens operating manufacturing concerns in the zone to construct homes incidental to
the manufacturing use.

R.95, 158.

On

Nove~ber

9, 1977, the

Planning Commission took action to disapprove Plaintiffs'
preliminary plan based on the fact that:

(l)

Development

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-3- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of residential subdivisions in M-1 ;cones was contrary to
the land use ordinance.

(2)

Development of a rtc·sid,'ntial

subdivision in an M-1 zone is contrary t'l the City's master
plan.
(4)

(3)

Accesses to the subdivision wPre inadequate.

The location of the railroad on three sides of the

subdivision made it an inappropriate site for housing.

R.96.

Some of their reasons were further articulated in a letter
to the Municipal Council dated November 17, 1977.

R.97.

On November 17, the Plaintiffs appeared before the
Municipal Council requesting that their preliminary plan
be approved.

The

~!unicipal

Council reviewed the

Plannin~

Commission's letter then refused to approve the proposed
subdivision.

R.99-100.

drawn up to elimir

-n

~o

protective covenants were ever

uufacturing uses within the

subdivision and no second exit from the subdivision was
ever planned.

R.l55.

It was never modified in any way

but remained as originally presented.
Because the Municipal Council began preparations to
amend or clarify the zoning ordinance on the matter of
housing in M-1 zones, Plaintiffs coi'C11enced this action on
December 23, 1977, on which date application for a
restraining order was made which order was made on January 3,
1978 restraining the City from amending its zoning ordinance.
R.l4.

On April 18, 1978, after motion by Defendants, the

injunction was terminated.

R.B0-81.

The City's change

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11r clarlflcatiun of the ~onlng ordinance took place on
January 19, 1978 (R.l02) and became effective as it
pertained to Plaintiffs' property on the date the injunction
was terminated.
ARGUI.lENT
I

TilE APPROVAL OF SUBDIVISIO~ ACCESSES AND ROADWAYS
INVOLVES A DEGREE OF DISCRETION THE EXERCISE OF
WHICH WAS JUSTIFICATIOX FOR DISAPPROVAL OF
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED SlBDIVISION.
In dealing with questions of whether a proposed
rP.sidential subdivision plan should be approved, Defendants
recognize and have no argwnent with the fact that the act
of approval is administrative in nature, Martindale v.
Anderson, et al., (Ut. 1978) 581 P.2d 1022, and largely
ministerial, Eldorado at Santa Fe, Inc., v. Board of
County Commissions of Santa Fe County, 39 N.JI. 313, 551
P.2d 1360 (1976).

However, many administrative actions

involve some discretionary action.
of subdivisions.

So it is with approval

Roussey v. City of Burlingame, et al.

(Cal. 1950) 223 P.2d 517, Ayers v. City Council of City
of Los

An~elcs

(Cal. 1949) 207 P.2d 1.

Take for example

Lhe act of openlng a road to public use which is part of
the action taken when a subdivision is approved.
In Town of Perry v. Thomas, et al., 82 Ut. 159, 22 P.2d
~13

(1933), where a town decided to convert a private road

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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into a public street and to widen it al the
property owners and

citi~ens

town's right to do so.

sa~c

time,

in the area questioned the

There this court stated:

"Under powers thus delegated to municipfl.J boards
the necessity, expediency, or propriety of opening
a public street or way is a political question,
and in the absence of fraud, bad faith or abuse
of discretion the action of such board ~ill not
be disturbed by the courts." (citing cases).
22 P.2d 343, 345.
The traffic flow, access, location and configuration
of a new roadway has always been a legitimate concern
for cities including proposed accesses resulting from a
subdivision of land.

Nicoli v. Planning and Zoning

Commission of Town of Easton, 179 Conn. 89, 368 A.2d 24
( 1976).
In Pearson

Kc~~

C~rporation

v. Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396,

271 H.E.2d 218 (1971), the county planning corrEission
denied approval of plaintiff's proposed residenTial subdivision
even though the plan itself was not intrinsically unacceptable beca~se the project was so located as to create danger
to nearly residents in that roads through which the plaintiff
would channel traffic were too narrow and unable to
accommodate additional traffic, and the absence of sidewalks
would increase hazards to young children going to school.
In that circumstance the highest court for the St;' te of 'iev.
York said:
"But the co=ission is not lir:1ited in disapprovinc;
a subdivision, to an intrinsic evaluation of th<c
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
-6-may contain errors.

c;ubdivision itscdf.
It may consider, among other
things, t!Ho "safety" and "general welfare" of the
county, including adjaCfcnt areas, Thus, as a
matter of legal power, the commission acted within
its jurisdiction. And if it was within its
jurisdiction it is not easy to say that its action
was arbitrary and without reasonable basis."
271 N.E.2d 218, 219.
The following cases are further examples of the proper
exercise of discretion in the approval or disapproval of
subdivisions:

Stoptaugh v. Bd. of County Commissioners

of El Paso County, (Colo.) 543 P.2d 524; Barke & McCaffrey
Inc., v. City of Merriam, (Kan. 1967) 424 P.2d 483; and
Jones v. Town of Woodway, (Wash. 1967) 424 P.2d 904.
In this case presently before the Court, the planner,
the planning

co1~ission,

and the municipal council expressed

concern about the single access proposed by Plaintiffs
(R.92, 96, 97, 153, 157), and the suggestion was made that
Plaintiffs provide another means of ingress and egress for
the proposed subdivision.

R.92, 157.

That second means

of ingress and egress was never provided and the subdivision
plan remained as it was originally presented.

R.l55.

Consider,

as the Defendants did, what would be the result if a fire
started in the subdivision, or a person was choking and the
fire engine or ambulance and medical technicians had to
wait an extra five minutes while the railroad people were
notified that their stopped train or switching operations
were blocking the subdivision access.

Such a possibility

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dictates as<:cond access frcl' of conflicts with the
trains.
The subdivision ordinance itself provides for the
exercise of the kind of judgment exercised here.

Section

17-22-l, Revised Ordinances of Logan City, provides:
"Purpose.
The following rcquireJCwnts controlling
the subdivision of land are designed to provide
for the orderly development of LoGan City and to
secure a coordinated road laynut and adequate
provision for traffic, transportation~ recreation,
water, drainage, sewage and other facilities in
order to promote the health, safety, convenience
and general welfare of the inhabitants of Logan
City."
In essence, one of the reasons for denial of Plaintiffs'
subdivision was that it did not P.Jake "adequate provision
for traffic" necessary for the promotion of the "health,
safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants
of Logan City," especially for the ones who would live
in the suudivision.
II
DEFENDANTS PROPERLY DENIED APPROVAL OF PLAINTIFFS'
PROPOSED SUBDIVISION Brc.,;esE TEE PF10POSED SITE
WAS NOT IN A LOCATION OR EK\'IR0\'1£'\T SUITABLE
FOR RESIDENTIAL HOUSI~G.

The subdivision ordinance provides:
17-22-6.
GenPral rPquirements and mini1:1um standards
of design.
(c)

Lots.

(J)
The lot arrangcm<:nt and dFsign shall be sllch
that lots will provide s;Jti:~f:-l.ctory and dc;;iralJl<!
sites for buildings :1.nd b<· prop<-r1y J'(•lat<·d to
topography, to the character o:' surroundin!;
development, and to cxistin;~ and )lJ'olJahl•· f'uttJrc•
Sponsoredrequir<-!ments.
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.H.70.
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,;nJTUU!Hlql

hy rai J road tracl's on thrr:e sides.

R.97, 155.

Only on<' m<•ans of ingress and ,·,;;rc:ss was provided 11·h ich
would require that every man, woman and child would be
required to cross the tracks to the east in order to exit or
enter the development.

R.97.

The proposed development

was in an hl-1 zone and along side a railroad spur.
on the spur such as

refri~erator

Activity

cars l>·ould create a

nir;httirr,e annoyance to the neighboring residents.
The possible conflicts with 1.1-1 use;; was brought
to the attention of the developer (R.97, 97), and a request
was made by

~.!unicipal

Council Chairr.Jan Claude Burtenshaw,

that protective covenants be written to at least protect
the subdivision from within, but the record reveals that
none were ever presented for approval prior to the time
approval of the subdivision by the municipal council was
demanded.

The city planner reported that no protective

covenants were ever filed with or presented to the City. R.l54.
To approve a subdivision under the circumstances and
in the locati<Jn requested by Plaintiffs would most likely
create an undesirable residential area with dissatisfied
residents moving out and unwitting new owners moving in
until knowledge of the problems became common knowledge,
causing property values to fall and permanent families to
;;tay away,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-9digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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III
DEFENDANTS PROPERLY REJECTED PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
SUBDIVISim! BECAUSE IT DID ~OT PHOVIflE FOR
WALKWAYS BET\';EEN BLOCKS OVEH 800 FEET LONG AS
REQUIRED BY DEFENDA~T'S SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE.
At the time Plaintiffs were urging approval of their
subdivision most of the attention was centered on the
controversy of whether the zoning ordinance authors intended
to allow residential subdivisions in 1!-l zones :.lnd whether
the ordinance itself allowed it.

Other matters were of

course considered, but one matter received little attention.
Section 17-22-6, Logan City Ordinances, states:
17-22-6. General requirements and minimum standards
of design.
(d)

Blocks.

l. The maxi~um length of blocks shall be not more
than thirteen hundred (1300) feet.
In blocks
over eight hundred (800) feet long there shall be
provided a dedicated walkway through the block
at approximately the center of the block.
Such
walkway shall be not less than ten (10) feet wide. R.68.
Plaintiffs never complied with this ordinance at any time.
The subdi~ision plat itself illustrates this (R.l55) as does
the affidavit of Mark Brenchley, City Planner.

R.J51.

IV
THE PROPOSED SUBDIVISIO~ IS CONTRARY TO THE
AND SPIRIT OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE.

I~TENT

In the above three arguments, Defendants have attempted
to show the deficiencies in Plaintiffs' proposal as it
relates to the City's subdi\'ision ordinance.

In addition

the sulJdivision :md its pro]Josed site is contrary to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intent of the' :-coning ordin2nce itself.

It is true that

"single f:cmi 1y dwcl 1 ings" were pcrmi tted uses in t!1e ~f-1

zone on th<: date! Pl:1intiffs submitted their application,
but nowhere does the zoning ordinance refer to whole residential
subdivisions.

The planning commission, the municipal

council and the planner were all under the impression that
the zoning ordinance would be frustrated if such a
development were allowed.

R.95, 96, 97, 100, 154.

The

ordinance had always been construed by the planner as only
allowing occasional residential use incidential to manufacturing uses.

R.l54.

That is the way the ordinance now stands

as amended (to clarify) in January 1978.

R.lOl-102.

v
THE PROPOSED SUBDIVISION CONFLICTS WITH LOGAN CITY'S
t,JASTEH PLAN.
When approving subdivisions the municipality must look
not only to the requirements of the subdivision ordinance
but also to the zoning law and then finally to the city's
master plan for guidance.

In Wes Linn Land Co. v. Board of

County Commissioners, 36 Ore.App. 39, 583, P.2d 1159 (1978)
the county denied approval of the subdivision and the
developer 3ppealcd to the Court of Appeals.

The principal

issue there was whether the county's findings were adequate.
The court said they were not and remanded the case.

During

the course of r•'nclc:ring the cleci sian, the court referred
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the various considerations:

"A subdivision application which conforms to a
zoning ordinance may nevertheless be denied if the
application of the zoning ordinance is inconsistent
with the cor:1prehensive plan or with statewide
goals, or if the application fails to conform to
the subdivision ordin~nce, but the order must express
the reasons the ~se permitted by the zoning
ordinance is not allowed.
Here, the application
for residential development within a residential
zone was denied in part, for exa~ple, because it
was not agricultural, but there was no explicit
application of any plan provision or goal which would
override the zoning ordinance.'' 583 P.2d 1159, 1161.
The same court in another case re,ferred to the
considerations of subdivision ordinance, zoning law, and
mater plan as having a hierarchical relationship:
"There is a recognized hierarchical relationship
between the comprehensive plan, zoning laws
and subdivision ordinances. At the bottom of the
hierarchy is the decision to approve or disapprove
a tentative subdivision plan.
In approving a
subdivision, the decision-making body must first
ascertain whether it is in co~pliance with the
zoning ordinance. Bienz v. City of Dayton, 29 Or.
App. 761, 566 P.2d 904, rev. den. (1977). Next
it must determine that the zoning ordinance is in
compliance with the comprehensive plan. Baker v.
City of hlilwaukie, supra. The plan has been likened
to a constitution implemented by zoning and
subdivision ordinances. Baker v. City of Milwaukie,
supra, 271 Or. at 507, 533 P.2d 722." 1000 Friends
OfOregon v. Board of County Commissioners, 32 Ore.
App. 413, 575 P.2d 651, 656 (1978).
The master plan contemplated no substantial residential
development in the hl-1 zone.

That was one of the reasons

the planning commission rejected the proposed subdivision.
R. 86,

96, 97.

If Plaintiffs would have done their homework

with regard to the expectations of the• !:1astPr plan, perhaps
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-12Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

II'<TC

not to be clevel opec! in the '·.!-1 zone.
Section l7-22-1(a) of
17-22-1.

Lo~an

City Ordinances states:

Preliminary plan.

(a) Each subdivider of land should confer with the
Planning Commission before preparing tfie preliminary
plan in order to become thoroughly familiar with
subdivision requireMents and with proposals of the
official comprehensive plan affecting the area in which
the proposed subdivision lies.
(Emphasis added.) R.66.
Thus, the ordinance imposes a duty upon the developer to
know or to find out about the expectations of the master
plan.
VI
THE DISAPPROVAL OF A SUBDIVISIO~ 0~ SEVERAL GROUXDS
ONLY ONE OF WHICH MAY BE VALID IS SUFFICIENT
JUSTIFICATION FOR DISAPPROVAL.
The Plaintiffs' proposed subdivision was formally
disapproved by the planninG conr.1ission on the follo1•:ing
grounds:
l.

It was against the "intent of the Logan City
Land Use (Zoning) Ordinance.
R.87, 97, 157-158.

2.

It was contrary to the intent of the Logan
City Master Plan. R.87, 97, 154, 157-158.

3.

It provided only one means of ingress and
egress causing potential hazards.
R.86, 87, 97.

1.

Railroad activity on three sides of the
subdivision was a danger to those who would be
living there.
R.86, 87, 97.

The Stipulated Statement of Facts states that the abo\·e
reasons for rr'jcction arr" only :cu1~1e of the reasons.

R.87,
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paragraph lG.

One other rt'ason, had they

~;iven

th(, plan's

details careful consideration, was the absence of th<o
pedestrian walk\ray

r~entioned

in Arzumc:nt V above whi ell was

brought to the trial court's attention in the motions which
it ruled upon.
The stated reasons the municipal council gave for
rejecting the preliminary plan were:
l.

No protective covenants were provided to
protect against ~-1 uses within the subdivision.
R.l57, paragraph 2.

2.

There was only one means of ingress and egress
and that was across a railroad track.
R.l57,
paragraph 2,

3.

To allow a residential subdivision in an M-1
zone would be to violate the spirit and
intent of the zoning ordinance.
R.l57-158.

4.

The location of a residential subdivision in an
M-1 zone runs contrary to the City's master
plan. R.l57-l58.

5.

The subdivision would he surrounded by a railroad
on three sides. R,86.

An unstated reason for rejecting the preliminary
subdivision plan which was not articulated by the municipal
council until later was that it did not provide for pedestrian
walkways through blocks of over BOO feet long.

This matter

was brought to the attention of trial court, but the
court apparently considered the matter unimportant.
If any of the above reasons are sufficient for proper
denial of Plaintiffs' proposed subdivision, then this Court·

-14-
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~;hould

hold the Defendants' denial to be justified and

reverse the trial court.
City of Putnam,

Davian v. Planning Commission of

174 Conn. 384, 387 /\.2cl 562 (1978).

VI I
THE J.!ERE APPLICATION FOR A SUBDIVISION OR THE APPROVAL
OF THE SAv.IE BY A CITY, WITHOUT ~!ORE, DOES NOT
CREATE VESTED RIGHTS IN THE SL'BDIVISION OWNER WHICH
FOREVER FREE llHI FRO'.l SUBSEQ!JI::T ZONING CHANGES.
Plaintiffs and the trial court avoided the application
of the subsequently adopted zoning an:endments to Plaintiffs'
planned subdivision by relying on Contracts Funding & Mortgage
Exchange v.1laynes,

( Ut. 1974) 527 P. 2d 1073.

In that

case plaintiff purchased property which was then unzoned.
Thereafter, he requested the county planning commission to
grant him a conditional use permit for construction of mobile
homes, which it did.

Then about three weeks later after it

had sought the opinions of neighbors in a hearing, it
denied plaintiff's request for a building permit.

About

four months later, plaintiff renewed its request for a
building permit.

Two days after that the county amended

its zoning ordinance to exclude the construction of mobile
homes in that area, and at the same time denied plaintiff's
request for a building permit.

That case differs from this

one in the following respects:
1.

In Contracts the zoning law clearly permitted
the use requested, but in this case the
zonin~ law said nothing about construction of
subdivisions in IJ-1 zones and the city had
~lways construed the ordinances to prohibit such
development.

R.l51.
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2.

In Contracts, pJaintitf had done <\<>rythin1;
issu:~ncc of a llllilrling permit,
then made a rr'qUr'~t for the same.
In this
case Plainti~ffs h:cd not done cvcrylhin1~ nccc"s:1rv
and prerequisite to the io;s11::tr1ce of a building ·
permit.
They had only applied for preliminary
approval of a subdivision plan.

prcrequisitr~ to

3.

In Contracts, the only reason for denial of
plaintiff's building permit request was that
local residents opposed the construction.
No
Other reason was given:
"There is nothing in this record to indicate
that the county or anyone else denied the
application for a per~it because of failure
to file something, pay something, clo something
or violate something." 527 P.2d 1073, 1074.

Reasons for refusing to approve Plaintiffs' plan
for a subdivision are listed and explained above, but
essentially they are:
A.

Subdivisions in U-1 zones violate the intent
of the zoning ordinance.

B.

Subdivisions in ~-1 zones violate the intent of
the master plan.

C.

The subcli.vision prcAid<=s inadertuate access (one
access over railroad tracks).

D.

The subdivision provides for no walkways in blocks
longer than 800 feet.

E.

The subdivision is in an improper location for
residential living because it is bounded by
railroad tracks on three sides.

F.

No protective covenants for excluding manufacturing
uses within the subdivision have ever been
presented, received or revie~ect.

Again,

this Court

reiter~_tec;

the principal problem in

Contracts:
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is no1hing in t!Jis record to show that
pl<Jintiff ll'flS asked for rJ:tps, data, c:vidcncc, or
anything clsc,--since it was nryer given any
conditions with which it r1ust ha\'C and mav have
complied,--only nothing but an arbitrary iurndown."
527 P.2d 1073, 1074.

"--Uwrt'

One can hardly say the Defendants gave Plaintiffs
"nothing but an arbitrary turn-dmm."

In a,ddi tion to the

technical requirements for subdivisions and residential
building, may the approving agency consider the broader
policies and goals to be achieved by a municipality in an
attempt to

organi~e

itself and to promote the health and

welfare of its citizens?

Certainly, the Plaintiffs have

exhibited little interest in such matters.

The City has

done its best to anticipate and avoid the problems and serious
dangers which most certainly will befall the proposed
development and the people who may live in it.

If this Court

does not reverse, both it and the developer can assume
responsibility for what happens there, because if the
District Court's decision is upheld there is no regulation
regarding zoning or subdivisions which the City can
adopt at any time in the near or distant future,

no matter

how critical or important it might be, which the Plaintiffs
in this case cannot ignore.

As they argue, their rights

arc "vested" and nothing can change that.
The Utah case which comes closest to articulating
till'

r1ccepted principles found in the concepts of non-conforming
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uses and vested rights is Wood v. ;:rnth Salt Lake,

lS Ut.2d

245, 390 P.2d 858 (1964).
In Wood the plaintiff again was at the building permit
stage when he ran into

proble~s.

His predecessors had

subdivided and platted the property in 1955 which was
accepted and dedicated by the City of North Salt Lake at
approximately the same tirne.
question was enacted in 1957.

The zoning ordinance in
In 1963 the plaintiffs

were ready to construct homes and applied for a building permit.
The city refused to grant it because the lots had only
6,000 square feet (as originally platted) instead of 7,000
as required by the 1957 ordinance.
the building

per~it,

Prior to applying for

water rnains and sewer mains had been

installed in tl1e streets.

Both systems provided connection

facilities in front of each lot for which plaintiff's
predecessors had paid their fair share.

One of the lots

was owned by a single owner who had no way of getting the
extra square footage required by the city before he could
build.

Under these circumstances, the court said:

"Without canvassing fine distinctions, we
simply conclude that enforcement of the
ordinance, subject of this action, eminently
would he unfair, inequitable, discriminatory and
inconsonant with realistic concepts of affinitive
and privileged use of one's property. Enforcing
this ordinance would render a 60' lot, owned by
one individual, utterly useless and no doubt
a weed-infested liability, although the purch~ser
presumably \'.'as put to the expe-nse rnent i.oned abov<=--"
390 P.2d 858, 859.
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t'

B('C:1Usc plaintiff would he
impo~~ition

unre~sonably

damaged by

of the nc:w regulation and because the city made

no effort to as,;crt any police powers through appropriate
procedures, the court relieved the owners of the 7,000
square foot lot requirement.

This court did, however,

recognize:
"In reasoning as we do, we are not unmindful of the
authorities that sanction zoning ordinances
where persons are not unreasonably damaged
thereby, but at the same time we are alert to and
mindful of the authorities that strike down such
ordinances where resulting damage is substantial,
as we think is true in the case of a one-unit
owner in the platted area here--and we cannot
lay down a rule for him, but not one for him in
the area who happens to have two adjoining lots.
We say this under the particular facts of this case,
none other." 390 P.2d 858, 859.
The above reference indicates that unless the damage
to the private developer is substantial then efficacy should
be given to the subsequently enacted or amended zoning
ordinance.

The only thing in the record which would

indicate that Plaintiffs are damaged at all is the fact
that they have spent $1,335 for a boundary survey and
$890 for the preparation of a preliminary subdivision plat.
It is submitted that the boundary survey has value to the
Plaintiffs regardless of what they do with their property.
Thus, Defendant is left with the loss of the $890 for the
preliminary subdivision plat.

That amount is insubstantial

for purposes of acquiring vested rights under the circum-;lances of this case.
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Plaintiffs also cited !\.(cady to Pour

Ine. v. 1.\c:Cuy,

95 Idaho 510, 511 P.2d 792 (1973) a'; bcin1' in support of
their position.

Again, R'oady To Pour invulvcd a city's

refusal to grant a building permit after plaintiff had
done everything necessary or prerequisite to its issuance.
Plaintiff attacked the subsequently enacted zoning ordinance
which completely eliminated the industrial zone as arbitrary,
capricious, and confiscatory.
City's amendment has been made.

~o

such attack on Logan
In Ready To Pour the court

pointed to "uncontroverted evidence" that there were
similar cement batch plants in the area and other operations,
including the city's which were industrial in nature.
There is nothing in the case which stands for the proposition
that once the plaintiff built his batch plant, that it
didn't become a non-conforming use and subject to the
ordinance and that all other requests for building permits
could not be denied because of the change in the zone.
Here the Plaintiffs were not at the building stage.
building permits have ever been requested or denied.
likely it will take several years to

~onstruct

No
~ost

homes on

all 87 lots planned for the subdivision, yet Plaintiffs claim
perpetual freedom of their pla:1ned development from subsequently
enacted zoning ordinances, no matter how great the need.
That is not reasonable.
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AL

Llw tri;d

~.!;Jricop<J.

l"vel Plaintiffs also cited Countv of

v. An:---.1•:ool

Hnb1nson v. Li nLc,

Inc.,

(Ari?:. 197:1) :'i06 P.2d 282, and

(Ariz. 19GG) 420 P.2cl 923.

In the

County of Maricopa case the developer had secured the
approval of both the planner and the planning commission.
After the county refused to approve the subdivision plan,
plaintiff sued in mandamus.
so found,

~as

There it

clear, and the court

that plaintiff had met all the legal requirements

for approval, and once approved and filed, the lots became
"legally established" by statutory r:Jandate and no longer
subject to zoning changes affecting their size, etc.

The

earlier case of Robinson v. Lintz, supra, was cited.

That

also was a mandamus case against the City of Phoenix for
refusing to issue building permits because the previously
filed subdivision lots did not meet the minimum area
requirements of the city ordinance.

The subdivision had

previously been a part of the unincorporated area of the
county.

The subdivider applied for building permits based

upon her previously filed subdivision.

The question in that

case was whether plaintiff's lots had become "legally
established" pursuant to a county ordinance which allowed
building on substandard lots 11hich had been "legally
established" prior to the adoption of the ordinance making
them substandard.

That situation is quite a different case

than is now before the Court.
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Plaintiffs failed to cite the 1nost recent 1\rizona case
which relates to the other t1•:o cases and the problem at
hand.

Dawe v. City of Scottsdale, 119

1\ri~.

486, 581 P.2d,

1136 (1978) is a typical example of the proper application

of the universally accepted principles of vested rights and
non-conforming uses.

In that case plaintiffs filed their

subdivision with maximum 10,000 sq. ft.

lots while the land

was still in the unincorporated ar0a of the county (1960).
In 1963 Scottsdale annexed the area. Their zoning ordinance
required 35,000 sq. ft. lots.

At the time of the annexation,

plaintiffs had not yet begun to build upon the lots.

Plaintiffs

brought an action seeking to compel the City of Scottsdale
to issue building permits and to have their subdivision
plat and lots declared "legally existing."

The trial court

found in favor of the city, the intermediate appellate
court reversed the city, and Arizona's Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the intermediate appeals court
and affirmed the decision of the

~rial

court.

The court

stated the issue as follows:
"The principal question at issue is whether the
appellant's have since 1963 a vested right to
develop substandard lots within the City of
Scottsdale because of the recording of their plat.
We think not." 581 P.2d 1136, 1137.
The court referring to the general principle stated:
"It has been repeatedly lwld that subdivision
ordinances apply to lots on prior recorded maps
which were unsold at the time of the ordinance's
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fs

<cnaclm.,nt.
Ziman v. Villahe of Glencoe, 1 Ill.!\pp.3rd
912, 275 ~.E.2d 16R (1971); Sherman-Colonial
Rc:t_lly_Cnrp. v. Goldsmith, lGG Conn. 175, 230
A.2cl S()g (l9G7); B1evPns v. City of ~.lanchester,
1::30 N.H. 28<1, 170 A.2d 121 (l9Gl); State ex rel.
Mar-Well Inc. v. Dodge, 113 Ohio App. 118, 177
N.E.2d 515 (l9GO); Caruthers v. Board of Adjustment,
290 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Civ.App.l956)."
Id. at 1137.
The court then went on to distinguish the case of Robinson
v. Lintz, supra and stated that Robinson '' ... does not hold
that such a lot is unaffected by subsequent zoning enactments.''
Id. at 1138.

The court further stated that:

"Robinson did not concern itself with the problem
we must decide here; namely whether the filing
of a plat immunizes a parcel of real estate from
subsequent zoning regardless of how urgent the need
for regulations might be."
Id. at 1138.
The court then compared the continued development of lots
in a subdivision with the vested rights principles applied
in building permit cases (where the zoning ordinance is
changed after the issuance of a building permit).

The opinion

concluded:
"We have held that where the amount of work which
was done toward the construction of a service station
was of small consequence, the permittee acquired
no vested right to complete the construction of
the building if the board of supervisors exercised
its power to rezone the property and revoked the
building permit. Verner v. Redman, 77 Ariz. 310,
271 P.2d 4G8 (195<1)." !d. at 1138.
The question here as was in the Dawe case, is whether what
Plaintiffs have done toward construction (actually putting
the land to us~was of such small consequence that the
subdivider is considered to have acquired no vested rights.
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That was essentially the question posed in Wood v. !~orth
Salt Lake, supra where this court in equity held that
plaintiffs woulcl lose too much when the cost of the
otherwise useless lot and the utility stubs to each lot
were considered.

The only thing these Plaintiffs will lose

if they are not allowed to go ahead is the $890 paid for
drafting the preliminary subdivision plan.

The boundary

survey has value to Plaintiffs regardless of what they
develop on the property.
There are nuoerous cases which deal with the same
vested rights issue in other states and the question always
is the same:

How much damage will the party suffer if the

zoning ordinance

w~re

applied to the balance of his

subdivision development or to his planned subdivision, or
to his planned building, or to his partially constructed
building.
N.E.2d 515.

One such case is State v. Dodge, (Ohio 1960), 177
There the plaintiff applied for a writ of

mandamus to compel the issuance of a building permit based
on the fact that the subdivision on which the building
was to be erected had been approved and filed before the
city changed its zoning ordinance requiring homes in that
area to have frontage of 100 feet instead of 50 feet as was
the case under the old law.

There the court stated:

'~he

mere fact that an allotment plat is approved
and recorded does not irre\·ocably fix the rights
of the parties. Valid chanf,CS m:1y thencafter be
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be made in tl!e ~oning regulations, and the
a1lotlcr must conform thcrl!to ... "
"There arc no buildings on the lands of this
allotment that do not ~onform to the requirements
of the zoning law. The claim of nonconforming use is
based on the assertion that, as soon as an
allotment is platted, and such plat approved by
the authorities, and funds are expended to improve
the grade and to lay out streets, a use of the lands
has occurred which causes it to be not subject to
any zoning regulations adopted after the approval
of the allotment plan."
"The fallacy of this clair:1 is so readily apparent
that no lengthy discussion need be made. This proposal
would prevent any changes in city planning, and fix
a use that never could be amended.
In addition, the
claim of "use" would be based upon hope rather than
upon occupancy and beneficial employment of the
lands. The land in this allotment without houses
did not become, by reason of the plat approval, a
nonconforming use." (Emphasis added.) 177 N.E.2d
515, 519-520.
In Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299 (1961), 170 A.2d
267, annotated in 95 ALR 2d 751, the property owner filed
a proposed subdivision before the town had even adopted a
subdivision ordinance.

The minimum lot area at that time had

apparently not been determined.

However, the town proposed

to change the zoning requirement to require 10,000 sq. ft.
lots in that area.

The question was whether the property

owner could build a cottage on a 4,000 sq. ft. lot using the
rationale of the continuation of a nonconforming use.

The

court rejected the idea saying that the lot had not yet been
put to a use and that a proposed use cannot create a nonconforming use.

The use must be actual, and the mere filing

of a plat or map could not foreclose a zoning authority from
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taking action which it,
necessary.

in its good judr;mcnt deemed

It should be notrd that the prop<:rty m1nc-r ilau

already built upon 179 of 448 undersized building lots and
had spent in excess of 328,000 to erect a permanent office
building and install other improvements for his development.
Another very good example is Blundell v. City of West
Helena,

(Ark. 1975) 522 S.K.2d 661 where the court disapproved

the use of some mobile home lots but approved the use of
others because construction of various kinds of utility
lines, grading of the lots, etc. indicated there was
"substantial use" even though the mobile homes had not
actually been moved in.

The court cited a number of cases

holding that contemplated use without active steps taken
beyond preliminary work or planning was necessary before a
party could claim vested rights to continue the use.
"Preliminary contracts or work which is not of a
substantial nature is not sufficient to establish
a vested right. County of Saunders v. Moore, supra.
The mere purchase cf property with intention to
devote it to a use is not sufficient in spite of
preliminary work, such as clearing, grading and
excavating, if that owner has not incurred
substantial obligations relating directly to the
use of the property." 522 S.\';,2d 611, 6G8.
See also Town of Lebanon v. Woods,
112, R. A. Vachon & Son

(Conn. 1965) 215 A.2d

Inc. v. City of Concord (N.H. 1972),

289 A.2d 646, Youngblood v. Board of Superviso_rs of San
Diego City (Cal. 1977) 71 Cal.App.3rd G55, 139 Cal. Rptr.
741.
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Disregarding the fact that Plaintiffs'proposed
subdivision is not yet approvPd and filed, most all the
treatises on the subject reflect the same point of view as
the above cases.

In 82 Am. Jur.2d, Zoning and Planning,

373, 698-700, 186, Nature and Extend of Use or Vested Right,
the rule is stated as follows:
''Most courts impose the requirement of actual use, as
distinguished from mere planned or intended use. A
mere contemplated use is insufficient to establish
an existing nonconforming use within the meaning of
a zoning law exempting nonconforming uses.
A right
to a nonconforming use is not consummated merely by
reason of the intent of a landowner to conduct that
particular use on his land; before a supposed
nonconforming use may be protected, it must exist
somewhere outside the property owner's mind.
It
has been held that a nonconforming use is not
established merely by showing that one has purchased
property for the purpose of a particular use. Platted
but undeveloped land is not normally regarded as a
"use" in zoning law for purposes of establishing
a prior nonconforming use, and, in the absence
of a statute or ordinance providing otherwise, the
filing of a map or plat by a developer of a subdivision
plat is not an existing use of land which can form the
basis of a nonconforming use.
According to some courts,
an "existing" use means the utilization of premises
so that they may be known in the neighborhood as being
employed for the purpose of that use."
"So far as establishing a nonconforming use is concerned,
mere preparation for use is not tantamount to actual
use, and even the investment of money in preparation
for a particular use of land does not stake out a
vested right to that use._ Ordinarily where no work has
been commenced, the fact that plans had been made
for the erection of a building before the adoption
of a zoning ordinance prohibiting the kind of building
contemplated is held not to exempt the property from
the operation of the zoning regulation.
In order for
a landowner to proceed with the construction of a
building or facility which may be utilized for a
nonconforming use, the cornmencel'lent of the construction
must have been substantial, or substantial costs
toward completion of the job must have been incurred."
(Emphasis added.)
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In Anderson's work, ,\mc:rican L~111· of /.oning,
principle is

st:-~tccd

til<~ rulL' or

as follows:

"No nonconforming usP is 'st ~~bl i shed l':hc-rc" the dcvcl upLr
has received preliminarv approval of his plat, or even
where filing is followe~ by extensive preliminary
work.
The courts have said that to recogni~e a
nonconforming use at this early stage wuuld result
in less risk to the subdi,ider, but it would tend
to perpetuate the prohJems that zoning is intended
to eliminate."
l American Law of Zoning, 402, Sec.
6.21, Filing and Approval of PJat.
In hlcQuillin, Municipal Corporations, the rule is
stated as follows:
"The general rule is that actual use is distinguished
from merely contemplated use when a zoning regulation
opposed to it becomeseffective is essential to its
protection as a lawful nonconforming use.
Accordingly,
the question of an existing business or other use
at the time zoning restrictions become effective
must be considered in the light of the principle that
the law is concerned, not with a mere plan or
intention, but with overt acts or failure to act.
Thus, it is not the present intention to put property
to a future use but the present use of the property
which must be the criterion.
That is to say, mere
intentions or plans at the time a zoning ordinance
becomes effective to use particular land or dwellings
for a certain use doPs not entitle one to that usc in
contravention of the ordinance .... Indeed, the fact
that a party makes a large investment in a city lot,
which at the time it is purchased is free of
restrictions, with an intent to use it for business
purposes, does not invalidate a zoning ordinance
subsequently adopted insofar as that ordinance restricts
the use of the lot to residen~ial purposes.
So also,
the mere filing of maps for the subdivision of a
parcel of real estate is not an establ1shmentof
a vested right to continue a use nonconforming to
subsequently enacted subdivision regulations."
(Emphasis added.)
SA '.!cQuilJin, \!unicipal Curpora"Lions,
34, Zoning, Sec. 25.188, l!SE";s Int,:ndcd or Planned.
The burden of proving the existence of vested rights
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to make it clear thatonly some of the planning commission's
reasons for rejecting the subdivision plan were listed in
its letter to the municipal council.

R.87.

The focus

indeed was on the single issue, but that does not mean that
all other issues and requirements were met as was the
conclusion of the trial judge.
CO\'CLUSIDN
It is clear from the affidavits, exhibits, and the
Stipulated Statement of Facts that Plaintiffs' proposed
subdivision has never been in a condition to be approVbd.
The clarification or amendment of the zoning ordinance
to clear up what would otherwise develop as a very serious
problem in the uses of M-1 land does prohibit the Plaintiffs
from carrying out their plans.

No "use" of the land

had begun, and Plaintiffs did not expend so much money in
preparation for use as to acquire a vested right to
develop contrary to the subsequently amended zoning
ordinance br any other zoning ordinance which might be
enacted sometime in the future.
RESPECTFULLY SUWI!ITTED

this~

day of May, 1979.

oll"nger
for Defendant-Appellant
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West Helena, supra.

Here the trial court

as~iuncd

plaintiff had done everything necessary prior to

that
appro~al

of his subdivision plan:
'' •.. after the plaintiff had done everything
procedurally he was supposed to do he was put
off by the city who then passed the ordinance ... "
R.l70.
Although the trial court in this case referred to the items
listed in paragraph 9 of the Stipulated Statement of Facts
(R.86) as not being resolved (conflicts with the master plan,
not adequate access, no protective covenants, and the danger
of the railroad tracks on three sides), he went on to
conclude that the subdivision was ready in all respects
for approval, ignoring the items listed in paragraph 9
of the Stipulated Statement of Facts as well as the facts
established by affidavits of

~ark

Brenchley (R.l53-l54) and

Council Chairman Claude Burtenshaw.

R.l57-l58.

The

requested roadways and pedestrian path\•:ays were not layed
out, nor were protective covenants provided as required
by city ordinance.

These considerations clearly indicate

that even if it were conceded that the land use ordinance
permitted residential subdivisions in \,!-1 zones, not merely
isolated occasional houses incidental to

~-1

uses, the

subdivision could not have been legally approved at the ti~e
it was presented.

For that reason, the Contracts Funding

case is not good precedent for this case.

-29-

Defendants tried
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CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed to c~pies of the
foregoing Brjef of Appellant, postage prepaid, to John
Preston Creer, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, Senior &
Senior, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,

this~

day of May, 1979.
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